At COP30 in Belém, the global climate community is once more confronting familiar questions: not only what we agree to do, but who shapes the how and why we agree to it. Calls for reform in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process increasingly focus on questions of transparency, participation, accountability and influence. One of the less prominent, but deeply consequential, threads in this debate is the role of informational lobbying, where interest groups aim to influence policymakers by providing information.
That is where our project enters the frame. We are investigating the extent to which lobbying by “green” and “brown” actors, meaning firms and interest groups promoting low-carbon versus high-carbon agendas, influences legislative voting behaviour in the European context. This research question is of utmost importance now that the European Union’s mandatory lobbying registry has come into force, allowing us to distinguish green and brown actors and track their meetings and map networks. This transparency enables empirical research that was much harder to do before. We examine meetings between lobbyists and EU decision-makers, classify actors as brown vs. green based on sectoral profile, and test whether observable patterns of lobbying intensity correlate with voting outcomes on major Green Deal votes.
Why is this important right now? At COP30, discussions about reform include not only process improvements inside the UN negotiations (for example clause-by-clause fixes, streamlining, voting rules) but also how external actors (e.g. corporations, industry associations, NGOs) shape national and regional positions before they even reach the COP floor. In the European arena, where we can systematically map lobbying contacts, we are able to shed light on this question empirically: not simply who is talking to whom, but whether that correlates with measurable outcomes (votes), and whether the pattern differs between actors promoting decarbonisation versus those defending legacy fossil-fuel interests.
Preliminary findings suggest that visibility and classification matter. If lobbying influences legislative outcomes (even partially) then the broader question at COPs, how to govern who influences climate policy and at what stage, becomes even more salient. Reform agendas should therefore not isolate COP negotiation rules from the upstream processes of lobbying, lobbying transparency and legislative dynamics inside major blocs such as the EU.
As COP30 unfolds, our project invites organisers, negotiators and observers to widen the lens: the formal negotiation hall may remain critical, but much of the influence shaping national positions, blocs, and ultimately votes take place long before delegates sit around the table. If COP reform is genuinely about inclusion, legitimacy and ambition, then attention to the “hidden” networks of lobbying and meetings is not a side issue, it is part of the relevance of the climate governance architecture.
We look forward to sharing further findings as the project progresses, and welcome engagement from practitioners and scholars at COP30 who are thinking about reform, transparency and the role of interest-group politics in climate policy.
Article credits: Fabio Santeramo (EUI), Asya Magazinnik (Hertie School), Valentina Bosetti (Bocconi University).
Photo credits: Tobias (unsplash).