Originally published in French on the Sciences Po Conférence website, this article is republished here as part of the CIVICA Experts in the Spotlight series.
The Rise of the European Union as a Baroque Supranational State If the European Union pools sovereignty and inherits its form from nation-states, empires, and local states ; moreover, If the EU mints currency, issues common debt, and represents its members on the world stage, why are we still so reluctant to call it a state?
Sylvain Kahn is a Senior Lecturer and Researcher at the Sciences Po Center for History, specializing in European integration. In his newest book, L’Europe, un État qui s’ignore (CNRS Éditions, 2026), he puts forward a bold thesis: the European Union is not merely an ‘unidentified political object’, but a form of state: a supranational state, which is thoroughly baroque.
The Interview:
The crux of your thesis is contained in a single sentence: ‘Europeans have thus been inventing a new state for three generations: the supranational state ’. What leads you to assert that the European Union has already crossed this threshold into statehood, when the general consensus tends to be the opposite, namely that it is an unfinished state?
Sylvain Kahn: What has struck me most in twenty years of research on the European Union is that, until very recently, it was taken for granted that Europe was not a state. In fact, until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, this was a sort of stereotype, a given, even within the academic world. Among researchers studying the European Union or European integration (the ‘Europeanists’), the hypothesis could, if necessary, be considered with the utmost caution.
Jacques Delors had coined two phrases that had become very popular in the 1980s: the European Union would be an ‘unidentified political object’ (an UPO) and a ‘federation of nation-states’. This expression ‘UPO ’ suited everyone, including the Europeanists. We have got into the habit of saying that European integration is a sui generis project. But once we have said that, we do not say what it is. Yet, generally speaking, in the social sciences, we try to define, describe, characterise and name the object we are studying.
From "Unidentified Political Object" to Geohistorical Reality
And so that is your aim, to try to describe this ‘unidentified political object’?
S. K. : Yes, you could say that. Mind you: I’m not claiming that this is the only way to describe it, nor even the only framework for doing so.
My work falls within the fields of geohistory, political geography and history. Geohistory is that branch of geography which compares territorial and spatial structures with one another, even if they belong to different cultural areas, and even if they belong to different historical periods. It differs from historical geography, which examines specific spaces of the past at a given time through the eyes of a geographer.
From a geohistorical perspective, it is clear that Europeans share a distinctive feature in terms of political culture: they have practised a vast array of political forms over time. Whatever point in time one takes as the starting point for this European history – be it the fall of the Western Roman Empire or the break-up of the Carolingian Empire – Europeans are distinguished by a very high density of geopolitical territorial structures.
In this regard, one might recall Paul Valéry’s phrase: Europe is that ‘little cape of the Asian continent ’. Yet on this ‘little cape’, a space that is, all things considered, limited, to the west of the vast expanse characterised by the dynamics of world empires, there has been, and still is, a multitude of territorial-political entities. Incidentally, this situation is comparable to that of South-East Asia.
In history books, we have become accustomed to describing this diversity of entities as states: the Republic of Venice is a state, the Holy Roman Empire is a state, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth is a state. And, of course, the empires we have termed ‘continental’ (to distinguish them from overseas colonial empires): the Holy Roman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ottoman Empire… All are regarded as states. Through several case studies – Hungary, France, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany… - regards European states as legacies now being drawn upon by Europeans in their construction of the European Union. Today’s European nation-states are the heirs to these legacies – empires, kingdoms, city-states, republics, local states, networks of cities, territories facing expansion by their neighbours… They are, in fact, nation-states that are very different from one another. And it is with these histories that they decided to join together in this new political and territorial entity that is the European Economic Community, which became the European Union.
One might then ask: why are we reluctant to say that the European Union, with its irregularities, peculiarities, shortcomings, gaps and imperfections, is a state? Political science, and in particular the sociology of international relations, has done much to challenge the idea of a typical, perfect or complete ideal model of a state — by speaking, for example, of failed states, quasi-states and de facto states. On the other hand, in Europe, there is a diversity of states that cannot be fully captured by the categorisation into ‘new’ and ‘old’ states, and which is obscured by the fact that we refer to them all as nation-states. The modern Greek state dates from the early 19th century and could in some respects be considered a failed state; Belgium as a quasi state; Luxembourg as a sort of relic of a medieval state, or a city-state, in today’s Europe. Yet it would never occur to any researcher to say that Greece, Belgium or Luxembourg are not states. Some European states (such as Estonia or Ireland) have fewer resources of actual sovereignty than certain regional entities (such as Catalonia, Lombardy, or Bavaria…); yet it would seem incongruous to deny them the status of a state.
So I find myself thinking: it is all rather strange, this doggedness with which both social scientists and commentators assert: ‘the European Union, of course, is not a state’.
Researchers are not the only ones to consider that the European Union is not a state. Is this not a generally accepted view within society?
S. K. : Of course, researchers are not the only ones to consider that the European Union is not a state. Take the French language: there is a sort of equivalence between ‘pays’ and ‘États’ ( ie: countries and states). We tend to think that at the UN, there are all the countries of the world, and therefore all the states; yet the European Union is not present at the UN.
But at the UN, there are also states of which it is now clear to say that they are states in name only. Sometimes, the state is a form that is more or less full, more or less empty.
Admittedly, the European Union is not present within this largely fictitious arena that is the UN – the idea that the world is composed of states all equally sovereign is not merely a fiction, of course, but the notion that all states are equal as states is partly a mythical narrative. The current assertion of their power, which certain states claim to be limitless, bears witness to this. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that the European Union is present at the G7, the G20, and the World Trade Organisation (where it is the sole representative, as EU member states do not sit there). At the G7 and the G20, the situation is unique: both the European Union and certain EU member states sit there at the same time.
So, if the EU is in the G20 and the G7, and sits alone in the WTO… can we not say that we are dealing with something resembling a state? Of course, one could certainly say that it is a different, peculiar kind of state. One could even call it incomplete, provided we clearly define the criteria for a complete state — and here, once again, many countries would no longer be states: statehood does not stem solely from international recognition, but also from the exercise of certain sovereign powers and public policies on a defined territory.
In the social sciences, the ‘state’ is synonymous with power, the ‘monopoly on legitimate physical coercion’ (Max Weber) and the exercise of sovereign powers. Therefore, since the European Union does not possess the attributes of power, one could say: it is not a state. This is understandable, but it merits scrutiny – if only because not all states in the world actually possess the attributes of power or the capacity to exercise their sovereign powers. On sovereign powers: currency, for example. Historically, one of the first characteristics indicating that a state is emerging is that, within a given territory, it holds the monopoly on minting and issuing currency, and on raising men to wage war. This is Charles Tilly’s thesis: the state made war and war made the state. In this respect, the European Union, even with the war in Ukraine, does not wage war. Nevertheless, it mints currency.
The geo-historical perspective invites us to view European integration as a long-term process. We must move away from the idea that it is a sui generis invention. It is possible, amongst other reasons, because Europeans draw on this rich heritage of varied and plural forms of statehood. And European integration, slow and clumsy as it is, step by step, is part of this tradition.
The "Baroque" State: Embracing Irregularity and Innovation
You use the phrase ‘baroque state’ to describe the European Union. What do you mean by this rather evocative image?
S. K.: Firstly, it is meant as a witty remark: to call it a ‘baroque state’ is to allude to the fact that the political life of Europeans, over the long term, is interwoven with and shaped by the importance of culture in the life of European societies. One way in which Europeans recognise themselves as Europeans – even if there is obviously a degree of mythologisation – is by imagining a society in which culture plays an important role. The Baroque movement is a milestone in European history. The word ‘Baroque’ has even become an adjective in everyday language. In short, the term signals the existence of a European whole, a culture, a society.
Secondly, I draw an analogy between the Baroque and the unique way in which the European Union functions as a state. I hope my fellow art historians will be lenient with a non-specialist here, but, in a general sense, the Baroque, in contrast to Classicism, is characterised in particular by movement, irregularity, surprise, shimmer, inventiveness and a pluralism of forms. However, when we say that the European Union is not a state, that it is an ‘incomplete state’, an ‘unfinished state’ or an ‘UPO’, we are operating within an implicitly classical definition of the state, which is part of a conception in which the only state is the nation-state.
But the long term and pre-contemporary historical periods strongly invite us to take into account forms of state that are not exhausted by a classical conception of the nation-state, which is, after all, a very recent form of state.
So, ultimately, might the European Union not be a ‘baroque’ state? Irregular, in flux, surprising? Above all, it is a question of shifting our perspective on the EU.
What strikes me as important is to bring the debate into the open: is the European Union a state? If we accept the debate, we open up the possibility that we, as citizens of nation-states, might feel more at ease with this project in which we have all been participating on a daily basis for three generations. The European Union is not a passing fad: we have been building it for three generations.
You propose July 21, 2020 as the date of birth, or at least as the founding moment of the European state. This date corresponds to the adoption of the recovery plan and the issuance of joint debt during the extraordinary European Council held at the height of the Covid crisis. Why?
S. K.: Firstly, in practical terms, if we look at the criteria for statehood: the issuance of EU bonds by the European Commission, at the request of Member States, is a significant event.
I am well aware that simply issuing debt is not enough to constitute a state. Cities, regions – local authorities – also issue debt. But, in our collective imagination, issuing EU denominated debt is not associated with a municipality or a region. The entity that issues Treasury bills is a state. This is how we tell the story of history and political life, almost daily, at the national level.
During the eurozone sovereign debt crisis (2010–2018), there were a few dramatic years in which almost every month brought its own ‘European Council of last resort’, such was the eurozone’s apparent proximity to implosion. The issue of EU bonds was highly divisive: the so-called frugal countries refused any issuance of European debt to resolve the crisis.
July 2020: The Symbolic Birth of a Supranational State
Yet they came round to the idea on July 21, 2020, following a European Council meeting lasting four days and four nights — the longest in the Union’s history, ex æquo with the one in Nice in December 2000. The heads of state and government, the European Commission, spurred on by the European Parliament as well as by economic and civil society actors, agreed to respond to the Covid crisis by issuing EU bonds.
I am not saying that this is enough to make the European Union a state in the full sense of the word, but it is a major symbolic turning point: we are moving from a glass half empty to a glass half full. We can now say: ‘it may be an incomplete state, but it is a state’. Previously, the question did not even arise.
This decision instantly resolves a debate that has raged for decades. Since 1951 with the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community), and then from 1957–1958 with the Treaty of Rome and the EEC, Member States have gradually come to see the value in pooling aspects of their national sovereignty. This is at the heart of European integration: pooling. It is in this sense that we can speak of a supranational state. Member States eventually pooled their currency in the 1990s – the decision had been on the table since the 1969 European leaders’ summit in The Hague. But most still refused to consider EU bonds. This extra step was taken with the mutualisation of the issuance of a common debt, twenty years after the euro came into force. There is no pre-established blueprint or plan; it is truly a political construction. It's a MacGyvered setup.
This issuance took place against a specific backdrop: the Covid crisis. Doesn’t that change the situation somewhat?
S. K.: Yes, of course, and European leaders were careful to state everywhere that this was a one-off measure, made necessary by exceptional and tragic circumstances. Covid had begun six months earlier. The toll is now known: around 1,350,000 deaths in the European Union and the countries within its territorial system. Europeans were no longer at all accustomed to this kind of health crisis; they had almost forgotten what it was like.
The shock was also visual and symbolic: the images of the Italian army burying the dead of Bergamo at night in mass graves. And Bergamo is in Lombardy, a region situated within that space which is the historic economic heart of Europe, stretching from London and Amsterdam to Florence, studied by the historian Fernand Braudel, and depicted by the ‘blue banana’ by geographer Roger Brunet, a space where, from the Quattrocento onwards, the bill of exchange, banking and urban civilisation were invented. This Lombard region is today a part of the European equivalent of California or Texas. And yet, in the face of Covid, the state was initially completely overwhelmed there.
Faced with such an emergency, to tackle the economic and social consequences of Covid and the lockdowns, and in the face of public sentiment, a joint debt is issued. It is then asserted that this will not happen again. As a historian of European integration, I simply note that there is no such thing as a one-off in this story. Political scientists speak of a ratchet effect: once a public policy instrument works, there is no going back; and it ends up being deployed again.
And that is what happened in 2025, with the €90 billion loan to support Ukraine, because Belgium refused to release the Russian assets frozen since February 2022. For this reason, for this public policy objective – support for Ukraine – the frugal states have changed their minds.
From then on, the picture is clear: the single currency, the EU bonds, the Union’s single representation at the WTO, the Court of Justice of the European Union, a transnational parliament elected by direct universal suffrage, a parliament of Member States – the Council of the European Union, a collective head of state – the European Council, a hybrid body, part government, part central (and lean) administration – the European Commission. The European Union combines the characteristics of a state, but of a particular and new kind: a supranational state. This is recognised by the fact that a country draws up and determines, together with its partners, policies which it applies sovereignly within its national territory. Speaking of a European state does not mean excluding the Member States; on the contrary, they are its essential components. The term ‘baroque state’ is a useful image: for a state comprising sovereign and independent nation-states is, to say the least, surprising, unexpected and unusual.
About the author:
Sylvain Kahn is a researcher and lecturer at Sciences Po specialising in European integration, geopolitics and the political geography of the European Union. His work explores the evolution of the nation-state, European sovereignty and the EU’s role in a changing global order.
